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AL-KINDI¯ AND THE MU‘TAZILA: DIVINE 
ATTRIBUTES, CREATION AND FREEDOM
PETER ADAMSON
The ‘Abb®sid caliphs al-Ma’m‚n and al-Mu‘ta◊im, who between
them reigned from 198 to 227 A.H. (813-842 A.D.) are best-known
to historians of philosophy for two things. First, they supported a
massive translation project that had already begun in the previous
century with al-Ma’m‚n’s grandfather, al-Man◊‚r. The result was
that many of the most important works of Greek philosophy and
science were rendered into Arabic.1 Second, they made into official
state dogma the theological views of the Mu‘tazila, who as a result
became the dominant school of ‘ilm al-kal®m in the first half of
the 3rd/9th-century. Before their influence waned during the reign
of al-Mutawakkil (died 247/861), the Mu‘tazila saw their teaching
on the createdness of the Qur’®n enforced in the infamous miΩna,
and Mu‘tazilism remained a vibrant force well into the next
century.2 It is thus natural to ask how these two policies might have
interacted with one another. What impact, if any, did Mu‘tazilite
ideas have on those who carried out the translation project, and
what impact did the translations have on the Mu‘tazila?
1 On the translation movement see D. Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture
(London, 1998). Other useful studies include ‘A. Badaw¬, La transmission de la
philosophie grecque au monde arabe (Paris, 1968); C. D’Ancona, La Casa della Sapienza
(Naples, 1996); G. Endress, “Die wissenschaftliche Literatur,” in W. Fischer (ed.),
Grundriß der arabischen Philologie, Bd. III, Supplement (Wiesbaden, 1992);
F.E. Peters, Aristoteles Arabus (Leiden, 1968).
2 The most useful single work on early Kal®m, including early Mu‘tazilism, is J. van
Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra, in six volumes
(Berlin, 1991-1995). The fifth and sixth volumes contain German translations of many
of the relevant reports of Mu‘tazilite views. Throughout the paper I will cite reports
from the original Arabic, but supply a reference to van Ess when applicable, with the
abbrevation VE followed by section and text number. On the Mu‘tazila generally, see
H. Daiber, Das theologisch-philosophische System des Mu‘ammar Ibn ‘Abb®d as-
Sulam¬, Beiruter Texte und Studien 19 (Beirut, 1975), which is wide-ranging despite
its main focus on Mu‘ammar; A.N. Nader, Le système philosophique des Mu‘tazila
(Beirut, 1956); H.A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam (Cambridge, 1976); as well
as numerous studies by R.M. Frank cited throughout in what follows.
This paper addresses the first of these two questions, by
discussing the impact of Mu‘tazilite ideas on Ab‚ Y‚suf Ya‘q‚b
ibn IsΩ®q al-Kind¬ (died soon after 256/870), whose circle of
translators in Baghdad was responsible for Arabic versions of
works by Plotinus, Proclus, and Aristotle, among others.3 It is
well known that al-Kind¬ was deeply influenced by these
translations, and that his extant treatises draw extensively on
Aristotle, Neoplatonists (including commentators on Aristotle
like John Philoponus), and other Greek authors ranging from
Christian theologians to mathematicians like Euclid. Less obvious
is the nature of his response, if any, to the Mu‘tazilite thinkers
who held forth in Baghdad and Basra in his own day.
The issue was first raised by the editor of al-Kind¬’s works,
MuΩammad Ab‚ R¬da, who argued in his preface to the edition
that al-Kind¬ at the very least shared some theological concerns
with the Mu‘tazila.4 This was followed by Richard Walzer in his
article “New studies on al-Kind¬,”5 who also saw a strong
connection between al-Kind¬ and the Mu‘tazila, on the basis of a
passage in which al-Kind¬ engages in Qur’®nic exegesis as a
digression from itemizing the works of Aristotle (the passage will
be discussed below, section II). Jean Jolivet provided a more wide-
ranging comparison between al-Kind¬ and Mu‘tazilite authors in
his L’intellect selon Kind¬, concluding that al-Kind¬ was “the most
theological of the philosophers of Islam, and the most philo-
sophical of the Mu‘tazilites.”6 These studies paved the way for
Alfred Ivry’s discussion in his translation of al-Kind¬’s On First
Philosophy.7 Ivry’s balanced and thoughtful piece yields the
conclusion that al-Kind¬ was aware of and responding to the
Mu‘tazila, but that he saw them chiefly as intellectual rivals.
Particularly important in establishing this is Ivry’s interpretation
of a passage in On First Philosophy as a polemic aimed at the
Mu‘tazila.8
3 See G. Endress, “The circle of al-Kind¬,” in G. Endress and R. Kruk (eds.), The
Ancient Tradition in Christian and Islamic Hellenism (Leiden, 1997), pp. 43-76.
4 Al-Kind¬, Ras®’il al-Kind¬ al-falsafiyya, edited by M.‘A.H. Ab‚ R¬da, vols. 1-2 (Cairo,
1950, 1953), pp. 28-31. 
5 In R. Walzer, Greek into Arabic (Oxford, 1962), pp. 175-205.
6 J. Jolivet, L’intellect selon Kind¬ (Leiden, 1971), p. 156.
7 “Al-Kindi and the Mu‘tazilah: a reevaluation,” in Al-Kindi’s Metaphysics (Albany,
1974), pp. 22-34. Ivry’s treatment begins with a useful summary of Walzer’s and Ab‚
R¬da’s interpretations.
8 Ivry’s view finds favor with H. Wiesener in The Cosmology of al-Kindi (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1993), p. 30: seeing the Mu‘tazila as “rivals,” al-Kind¬
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Al-Kind¬’s relationship to the Mu‘tazila is not, then, un-
furrowed ground, and it is worth saying why I think it fruitful to
revisit the issue here. First, there can be little doubt that al-Kind¬
was aware of and reacting to the Mu‘tazila. That he was aware
of them is simply obvious, given their prominence in his day –
many of his surviving works are dedicated to caliph al-Mu‘ta◊im
or his son, AΩmad, and thus date from between 218-227/833-842,
when the miΩna was in full swing. That he was reacting to them
is most evident from the titles of some of his works that are,
unhappily, lost to us. The list of al-Kind¬’s works in the Fihrist
includes several that without doubt waded into controversies in
which the Mu‘tazila were embroiled,9 including one that rejected
the theory of atomism held by the majority of the Mu‘tazila.10
Several others can be counted as probable engagements with the
Mu‘tazila as well.11 Since these explicit reactions to the Mu‘tazila
are lost, we must hope that further scrutiny of his extant works
will yield signs of his engagement with them.
“acknowledged the differences in method and overlapping of subject matter between
philosophy and Mu‘tazilite kal®m, and he took the side of philosophy.” I.R. Netton, in
“Al-Kind¬: the watcher at the gate,” in All®h Transcendent: Studies in the Structure
and Semiotics of Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Cosmology (London, 1989), pp. 45-
98, also takes a middle view, adding to the debate by pointing out that al-Kind¬’s
understanding of God’s oneness (tawΩ¬d) looks Mu‘tazilite in inspiration. On this see
below, section I.
9 F¬ anna af‘®l al-b®ri’ kulluh® ‘adl l® jawr f¬h® (On the fact that the acts of the
creator are all just, and have no injustice in them), K. f¬ baΩth qawl al-mudda‘¬ anna
al-ashy®’ al-flab¬‘iyya taf‘alu fi‘lan w®Ωidan bi-¬j®b al-khilqa (Examination of the
statement claiming that natural things perform only one act by the necessity of [their]
innate nature [or creation]), and R. f¬ anna al-jism f¬ awwal ibd®‘ihi l® s®kin wa l®
mutaΩarrik ˙ann b®flil (On that it is a false opinion that the body is neither at rest nor
in motion in the first moment of its creation). See Ibn al-Nad¬m, al-Fihrist, edited by
G. Flügel (Leipzig, 1871-2), pp. 256.4, 8-9, and 259.18-19 for these three titles. Ahmad
Hasnawi has pointed out that another title indicates that al-Kind¬ responded to a claim
made by Ab‚ al-Hudhayl: F¬ al-radd ‘al® man za‘ama anna li-al-ajr®m f¬ huwiyyih®
f¬ al-jaww tawaqquf®t (On the refutation of those who claim that there are moments
of rest in the falling of bodies through the air), in Ibn al-Nad¬m, al-Fihrist, p. 259.16-
17. See Hasnawi’s entry on al-Kind¬ in L’encyclopédie philosophique universelle, general
editor A. Jacob, vol. III: Les œuvres philosophiques, volume edited by J. F. Mattéi (Paris,
1992), pp. 655-7.
10 R. f¬ bufll®n qawl man za‘ama anna juz’ l® yatajazz®’ (On the falsity of the statement
of one who alleges that there is an indivisible part): Ibn al-Nad¬m, al-Fihrist, p. 259.19-
20. This was mentioned previously by Ivry, Al-Kindi’s Metaphysics, p. 50, footnote 52,
and F. Klein-Franke in “Al-Kind¬,” History of Islamic Philosophy (London, 1996), 169.
11 For example R. f¬ al-istifl®‘a wa zam®n kawnih® (On ability and the time of its
generation): Ibn al-Nad¬m, al-Fihrist, p. 259.16. The Mu‘tazilites ºaf◊ al-Fard and
Mu‘ammar ibn ‘Abb®d both wrote works by the title F¬ al-istifl®‘a: see van Ess,
Theologie und Gesellschaft, vol. V, pp. 252 and 254.
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A second reason for returning to this question is that previous
scholars have focused on al-Kind¬’s attitude towards Mu‘tazilite
methodology, rather than his attitude towards specific Mu‘tazilite
doctrines. One might think for instance of Walzer’s discussion of
al-Kind¬’s interpretation of the Qur’®n, or Ivry’s point that al-
Kind¬ was championing Greek rationalism – despite its foreign
provenance – over the theological approach of the mutakallim‚n.
The benefits of this strategy are clear enough. It helps to situate
al-Kind¬ in the tradition of those who, like al-F®r®b¬ and Ibn
Rushd, would defend falsafa as an equal and even superior
tradition to kal®m. But what I will undertake here is a rather
different project. Instead of focusing on the question of
methodology, my contrast between al-Kind¬ and the Mu‘tazila
will be based on three specific philosophical issues. These three
issues, chosen because of their salience for the Mu‘tazila rather
than their prominence in al-Kind¬’s extant works, are (1) divine
attributes, (2) the nature of God’s creative act, and (3) human
freedom.
Of these al-Kind¬’s views on (1) divine attributes have received
the most attention in the past,12 because he does deal with it
prominently at the end of his most important work, On First
Philosophy. In the case of (2) creation and (3) freedom, we will
have to delve a bit deeper into al-Kind¬’s writings to find evidence
about how he may have been reacting to the Mu‘tazila. I will show
that al-Kind¬’s ambivalent attitude toward Mu‘tazilite method-
ology is reflected in his treatment of Mu‘tazilite doctrines. He
typically accepts these doctrines in their broad outlines, but
transforms them by expounding and defending them in the
context of falsafa rather than of ‘ilm al-kal®m. Indeed, I hope to
show that al-Kind¬ was deliberately taking on debates from
within kal®m in order to show that philosophy has the resources
to settle those debates. A particularly striking example of this will
be provided in section II, where I show that al-Kind¬ was drawing
directly on John Philoponus in order to reach a satisfactory
interpretation of the Qur’®n’s description of God’s act of creating.
12 M. Marmura and J. Rist, “Al-Kind¬’s discussion of divine existence and oneness,”
Mediaeval Studies, 25 (1963): 338-54; C. D’Ancona Costa, “Aristotele e Plotino nella
dottrina di al-Kind¬ sul primo principio,” Documenti e Studi Sulla Tradizione Filosofica
Medievale, 3 (1992): 363-422; J. Janssens, “Al-Kind¬’s concept of God,” Ultimate Reality
and Meaning, 17 (1994): 4-16.
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I. DIVINE ATTRIBUTES
The most conspicuous point of contact between al-Kind¬’s
thought and Mu‘tazilism is his apophatic argument at the end of
the surviving portion of On First Philosophy (F¬ al-falsafa al-‚l®,
hereafter FP), which aims at showing that God cannot be spoken
of in the way created things are spoken of. In fact his argument
for this spans the whole second half of FP,13 beginning in chapter
3 with a classification of the types of utterance (malf‚˙: 126.8-10
[RJ 45.11-12]).14 This is followed by proofs that all things (other
than God) are characterized by both unity and multiplicity. There
must be a cause for this association of unity and multiplicity, a
cause that is itself essentially one (132.10-13 [RJ 53.12-15]). In
chapter 4 al-Kind¬ goes on to show that this cause, which he calls
“the true One” (or “essentially One”: al-w®Ωid bi-al-Ωaq¬qa), is
not subject to any of the categories (maq‚l®t), since these all
imply multiplicity (153.9-12 [RJ 83.15-18]). The upshot seems to
be that God, “the true One,” is completely transcendent, in the
precise sense that nothing can be said of Him. Al-Kind¬ does not
use the term ◊if®t, “attributes,” for what would be said of God,
but in other respects he seems here to follow the Mu‘tazila in
rejecting the application of normal discourse to God.15 Indeed,
several scholars have previously remarked on this agreement
between al-Kind¬ and the Mu‘tazila.16
13 The entire argument has been summarized by Marmura and Rist, “Al-Kind¬’s
discussion of divine existence,” pp. 339-46.
14 Citations to works of al-Kind¬ refer to page and line number from the edition of
Ab‚ R¬da: al-Kind¬, Ras®’il al-Kind¬ al-falsafiyya; see above, footnote 4. All references
are to volume I unless otherwise noted. Improved editions, with French translations,
are now appearing in the series Œuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d’al-Kind¬,
edited by J. Jolivet and R. Rashed. Some of the texts from which I will cite have already
appeared in volume II of the series, Métaphysique et cosmologie (Leiden, 1998). Where
applicable I will also cite page and line number from the editions in this volume,
prefaced by the abbreviation RJ.
15 Several texts produced under al-Kind¬’s guidance do however use the term ◊if®t,
including the Theology of Aristotle, the Book on the Pure Good (later known as the Liber
de Causis), and the Opinions of the Philosophers of Pseudo-Ammonius. For the Theology
see my The Arabic Plotinus: a Philosophical Study of the “Theology of Aristotle”
(London, 2002), and on ◊if®t see especially 5.4.4. For the de Causis see C. D’Ancona
Costa, Recherches sur le Liber de Causis, Études de philosophie médiévale, vol. 72 (Paris,
1995). For Opinions of the Philosophers see U. Rudolph, Die Doxographie des Pseudo-
Ammonios: ein Beitrag zur neuplatonischen Überlieferung im Islam (Stuttgart, 1989).
16 See e.g. Daiber, Das theologisch-philosophische System des Mu‘ammar, p. 134;
Netton, “Al-Kind¬: the watcher at the gate,” pp. 57-8; Janssens, “Al-Kind¬’s concept of
God,” p. 14.
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Al-Kind¬ first establishes the existence of God via an analysis of
the types of utterance. He itemizes them as “genus, form, individual,
difference, and accident, peculiar [accident] or common accident,”
but then goes on to explain that in fact all of these subdivisions fall
under two main classes: the substantial and the accidental
(jawhariyya, ‘ara¥iyya: 126.12 [RJ 45.14-15]). This distinction
between the substantial or “essential” and the accidental is
crucial to al-Kind¬’s first, brief argument for the existence of God:
Whatever is in one thing in an accidental way is in something else in an
essential way (dh®t¬), for whatever is in one thing accidentally is in another
essentially (bi-al-dh®t). And since we have made it clear that unity is in all
these [i.e. created things] accidentally… the unity that is in [them] accidentally
is acquired from what has unity in it essentially. Therefore, here is necessarily
a true One, uncaused in unity. (132.8-14 [RJ 53.10-15])
I will return below to the assertion, which must strike us as odd
in the midst of al-Kind¬’s apophatic argument, that God may after
all be called “one,” but “essentially” or “through Himself” (both
of which are possible translations of bi-al-dh®t).
First, let us compare the theory of utterance used in al-Kind¬’s
argument to that espoused by the Mu‘tazila. Generalizations
about Mu‘tazilite doctrines must be made with caution, since
even restricting our attention to those who worked before or
during al-Kind¬’s time, there is a wide array of various views held
by thinkers associated with the Mu‘tazilite tradition.17 Still, the
rough outlines of a shared theory of language emerge from later
reports of their doctrines. This theory was put forward primarily
in the service of a negative theology that originated with the
putative founder of Mu‘tazilism, W®◊il ibn ‘Afl®’. According to al-
Shahrast®n¬, W®◊il argued that to posit an eternal divine
attribute would be to assert the existence of a second God.18 Later
17 Indeed, it would be anachronistic to suppose that al-Kind¬ himself would already
see all the figures I will mention shortly, in both the Baghdadian and Basrian traditions,
as a monolithic “school” called the Mu‘tazila, defined by certain shared doctrines. It is
reasonable to suppose that he was aware of a tendency among numerous of his
contemporaries towards embracing negative theology or the reality of human freedom,
for example, and that he was aware that these figures formed a distinctive group or
groups. But my argument does not require even this fairly modest historical
assumption; it is sufficient for my purposes that al-Kind¬ was aware of and responding
to the doctrines of particular theologians (such as, and I suspect especially, Ab‚ al-
Hudhayl) that the later tradition classified as Mu‘tazilite.
18 Al-Shahrast®n¬, Kit®b al-Milal wa al-niΩal, edited by ‘A. al-Wak¬l in two volumes
(Cairo, 1968), p. 46.12-13. See further Nader, Le système philosophique des Mu‘tazila,
pp. 49-50.
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Mu‘tazilites agreed, often providing additional arguments for the
point, that God’s oneness prevents our positing real and distinct
divine attributes. So far, this seems not unlike what we find in
al-Kind¬.
But what do the Mu‘tazila mean when they say that there are
no such divine attributes? Later, hostile authors like al-
Shahrast®n¬ are quick to accuse the Mu‘tazila of ta‘fl¬l, the
rejection of the attributes authorized by the Qur’®n. A more
sympathetic interpretation must recognize that they do have a
positive theory of divine discourse. But to see this we must begin
from their theory of non-divine discourse: the “attributes” of
things God has created. According to most of the Mu‘tazilites,
created things consist of atoms, which are the bearers for
attributes. These attributes are called “accidents” (a‘r®¥).19 Here
is a typical report of their views from our most reliable source of
information on the early Mu‘tazila, al-Ash‘ar¬:
Some, among them Ab‚ al-Hudhayl, Hish®m, Bishr ibn al-Mu‘tamir, Ja‘far
ibn ºarb, Isk®f¬, and others, said that motions and rests, standing and sitting,
combinations and separations, length and breadth, colors, tastes, odors, and
sounds, speaking and silence, obedience and disobedience, unbelief and
professions of belief, and other acts of man, as well as heat and cold, moisture
and dryness, and softness and roughness, are accidents, not bodies.20
Now, there is a considerable degree of variation within the
physical theories of the early Mu‘tazila. Ab‚ al-Hudhayl, for
example, holds that a few accidents, such as rest and motion, are
predicated directly of atoms, while most supervene on collections
of atoms, which he calls “bodies.”21 Øir®r ibn ‘Amr on the other
hand says that there are no atoms, and that bodies are rather
collections of accidents without any distinct bearer for the
accidents apart from the body that is constituted from those
accidents.22 Still, the Mu‘tazila up through the time of al-Kind¬
seem by and large to agree on the following two principles:
19 Sometimes the word ma‘®n¬ is used instead, but without suggesting that the
properties are essential. See R.M. Frank, “Al-ma‘nà: Some reflections on the technical
meaning of the term in the Kal®m and its use in the physics of Mu‘ammar,” Journal
of the American Oriental Society, 87 (1967): 248-59, at p. 249.
20 Al-Ash‘ar¬, Maq®l®t al-isl®miyy¬n wa ikhtil®f al-mu◊all¬n, edited by H. Ritter,
Bibliotheca Islamica 1a-b (1929), 345.6ff [VE XVII.13].
21 Ibid., 311.11-312.1 [VE XXI.4]. 
22 Ibid., 305.5-7 [VE XV.1]. On Øir®r see J. van Ess, “Øir®r b. ‘Amr und die
‘Cahmiyya’: Biographie einer vergessenen Schule,” Der Islam, 43 (1967): 241-79, and
44 (1968): 1-70.
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(a) Whatever inheres in something else is a created attribute,
or “accident.”
(b) Such attributes are distinct from one another and from that
in which they inhere (which is usually taken to be an atom or
collection of atoms).
Here I want to draw attention to the fact that, unlike al-Kind¬,
the Mu‘tazila typically recognize only one type of properties or
inhering features in the case of created things, namely what they
call accidents. That is, they do not have anything like the
Peripatetic distinction between the “essential” and “accidental”
properties of created things (which means of course that the
Mu‘tazilite notion of “accident” does not correspond exactly to
the Peripatetic one).23 Thus Richard Frank has written that for
Ab‚ al-Hudhayl, “the beings that we most readily identify as such
– a man, for instance, an animal or the like – have not any
essential unity of being beyond the material unity of the body…
its being is that of a composite, a specific arrangement of atoms
conjoined and juxtaposed in space together with a complex set of
accidents which inhere in them, not ‘by nature’ as essential
properties belonging to its being, but simply as created in them.”24
What position would the Mu‘tazila have to take on divine
attributes, if principle (b) also held true for theological discourse?
It would follow from this principle that divine attributes would
be a plurality of things that are distinct from one another and
from God. But as already mentioned, from W®◊il onwards this
position is taken to compromise tawΩ¬d, and to represent poly-
theism, because it posits a number of things that are co-eternal
with God. This makes sense of what the Mu‘tazila say when they
do turn to the question of divine discourse. For in fact they seek,
in a variety of ways, to safeguard the truth of statements such as
“God is knowing” and “God is powerful.” But they typically do
23 While one might make an exception in the case of Mu‘ammar, he seems to me an
exception that proves the rule. He distinguishes between the properties of a thing,
which he calls ma‘®n¬, and the “nature” (flab‘) of the thing, which might be thought to
constitute a division between accidents and essence (see the critique of Wolfson’s
comparison of Mu‘ammar’s view to Aristotle in Frank, “Al-ma‘nà”). But in fact the
“nature” does not constitute a separate class of attributes or properties: rather it is the
cause or source of those properties. See al-Khayy®fl, Kit®b al-Inti◊®r, edited by A. Nader
(Beirut, 1957), p. 45.22-24: “Know that Mu‘ammar maintained that the forms (hay’®t)
of bodies are a natural act (fi‘l) from the bodies, in the sense that God formed them in
such a way that they would naturally make (taf‘alu) their forms.”
24 R.M. Frank, “The divine attributes according to the teaching of Ab‚ ’l-Hudhayl
al-‘All®f,” Le Muséon: Revue des études orientales, 82 (1969): 451-506, at p. 464.
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so by showing how we can avoid accepting principle (b) in the case
of God. For instance, Ab‚ al-Hudhayl affirms both that God’s
attributes are the same as Him (al-◊if®t… hiya al-b®ri’),25 and
that His attributes are not distinct from one another.26 Ab‚ al-
Hudhayl and other Mu‘tazilites also suggest that, unlike created
things, God may have attributes by virtue of His “essence”
(dh®t).27 But the Mu‘tazila cannot defend this claim by appealing
to an analogy between God’s attributes and the essential properties
in created things, because by principle (a), they do not believe
that created things have essential properties.
Now, al-Kind¬ agrees with the claim that nothing can be co-
eternal with God without compromising His oneness. Indeed I
believe this is the unifying theme of FP: it explains the seemingly
fortuitous juxtaposition of the argument against the eternity of
the world in chapter 2 with the argument for God as the true One
in chapters 3-4.28 To hold that the world is co-eternal with God is
to violate tawΩ¬d. But his analysis of statements about God’s
effects is significantly different from that of the Mu‘tazila, and
this leads to a correspondingly different position on divine
attributes. Indeed I hope that the contrast with the Mu‘tazila may
help to bring out positive aspects of al-Kind¬’s theology, aspects
that have not previously been noticed because of the prominence
of his negative theology.
As we saw, al-Kind¬ does distinguish between the essential and
accidental features of sensible things. He also uses this distinction
to explain the distinctive unity that is found only in God, by
repeatedly asserting that created things have unity “accidentally”
or from an extrinsic cause, while God has unity essentially (bi-al-
dh®t: FP 161.2 [RJ 95.16]). What does al-Kind¬ mean here by
25 Al-Ash‘ar¬, Maq®l®t al-isl®miyy¬n, 177.14-15 [VE XXI.62].
26 Ibid., 177.15-16 [VE XXI.62]: “If someone asked [Ab‚ al-Hudhayl]: ‘is [God’s]
knowledge [God’s] power?’ He said, ‘it is false to say that it is [His] power, and false to
say that it is other than [His] power.’” See also 484.15-485.6 [VE XXI.64].
27 For this position in al-Na˙˙®m see al-Ash‘ar¬, Maq®l®t al-isl®miyy¬n, 486.10-14
[VE XXII.173]. For ‘Abb®d ibn Sulaym®n, see 165.14ff [VE XXV.27], and also Daiber,
Das theologisch-philosophische System des Mu‘ammar, pp. 203ff. Similarly Øir®r says
that God is “knowing” and so on “through Himself” (li-nafsihi): al-Ash‘ar¬, Maq®l®t
al-isl®miyy¬n, 281.14.
28 The two themes are joined also in his short treatise On the Oneness of God and the
Finitude of the Body of the World (F¬ waΩd®niyyat All®h wa tan®h¬ jirm al-‘®lam), 201-
207 [RJ 137-147]. Here it is relevant to note that Ibn ºazm seems to have known FP
under the title Kit®b al-tawΩ¬d: see H. Daiber, “Die Kritik des Ibn ºazm an Kind¬s
Metaphysik,” Der Islam, 63 (1986): 284-302, at p. 287 note 29.
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“essentially”? Usually al-Kind¬ defines essential properties as
follows: a thing is essentially F if it would be destroyed by
becoming not-F. Thus humans are essentially alive and rational;
if they were to become non-living or non-rational their substance
would be corrupted.29 But if this is what he means by “essential”
in this context it seems absurd to claim that only God is
“essentially” one. After all, I am one human; if I cease to be one
then the substance that I am will be destroyed. And in fact, the
text makes it clear that al-Kind¬ accepts this sort of essential
unity in the case of created things:
“One” is said either essentially or accidentally (imm® bi-al-dh®ti wa imm® bi-
al-‘ara¥i). Accidentally, it may be predicated homonymously or synonymously,
or [by virtue of] a collecting of multiple attributes, as when we say that the
writer and the speaker are one, since they are both said of a single man, or of
man [generally]… The essentially [one] is whatever else is called “one,” among
the things we have mentioned that are called “one” – namely, all that whose
substance is one (jawharuh® w®Ωidun). (159.3-7 [RJ 93.4-9])
What, then, is the difference between the created thing whose
substance is one, and is thus essentially one, and God, Who is
essentially one? Al-Kind¬ answers this question in what follows,
as he points out that although the created substance is essentially
one in substance, it is multiple in other respects: by having
material parts, for example. God, by contrast, is not multiple in
any way:
Unity is an accident in all things other than the true One, as we have said. But
the true One is one essentially, not being multiple in any way at all, and being
undivided by species, or by virtue of its essence, or by virtue of anything else,
or by time, place, subject, predicate, whole, or part, from substance or from
accident, or any other kind of division or multiplicity at all. (160.17-161.5 [RJ
95.15-19])
What is distinctive about God, then, is not so much that He is one
by His very nature, but that He is one by His very nature and not
multiple in any respect.
This seems to be what al-Kind¬ means when he says that God
is one “essentially” instead of “accidentally,” and also when he
says that God is one “in truth” (bi-al-Ωaq¬qa) while created things
are one only “metaphorically” (bi-al-maj®z) (FP 143.12 [RJ 69.4];
161.11 [RJ 95.26]). One might be tempted to say that this emphasis
29 For this conception of essential properties in al-Kind¬ see e.g. FP 125.4-7 [RJ 43.
15-19].
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on God’s unity does not count as accepting the reality of a divine
attribute: it could be objected that “oneness” in this absolute
sense is nothing more than not having a multiplicity of attributes.
But al-Kind¬ means more than this when he speaks of God’s
oneness, for he goes on to claim that God is the principle and
source of unity for created things (FP 161.10-14 [RJ 95.24-96.3]).
Thus oneness is something positive, so much so that al-Kind¬ is
willing to describe God’s creative act as an emanation of oneness
onto sensible things (FP 162.2-3 [RJ 97.8-9]).
Furthermore, the argument we have seen is repeated for
another divine attribute elsewhere. God’s being only F, rather
than both F and not-F, also dominates the much shorter treatise
entitled On the True, First, Complete Agent and the Deficient
Agent that is [an Agent] Metaphorically.30 Here al-Kind¬ does not
use the distinction between essential and accidental at all. Instead
he distinguishes God from created things, by saying that God is
the “true Agent” (al-f®‘il al-Ωaqq), while His effects are agents
only in a metaphorical sense. This is because God alone acts
without being acted upon (183.6 [RJ 169.10-11]), whereas created
things are acted upon and indeed only “act” in the sense that they
pass on an extrinsic act to other things (see below, section (III),
for further discussion of this distinction). Just as, in his discussion
of divine oneness in FP, al-Kind¬ insisted that God is one and in
no respect multiple, here he insists that God is truly an agent,
and the only true agent, because only God is acting and not at all
passive or acted upon.
Again, the force of “metaphorically” here does not seem to be
that God is an agent in a quite different sense from created
agents: we are not in the presence of a theory of analogy, such
that the same term is applied with two different modes or
meanings.31 Rather, what al-Kind¬ means is that something is
“metaphorically” F just in case it is F in one respect and not-F in
another respect. If we were to expand this doctrine and apply it
to all divine attributes, we would have the following theory: for
any divine attribute F, God is truly F because He is essentially F
30 Al-f®‘il al-Ωaqq al-awwal al-t®mm wa al-f®‘il al-n®qi◊ alladh¬ huwa bi-al-maj®z,
182-184 [RJ 169-171].
31 Notice, however, that just as in a theory of analogy such as that of Aquinas, it 
is God as the first cause Who is the primary referent of divine predicates, so here 
God is the agent or “one” in truth, while created things are metaphorically one and
agents.
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and in no respect not-F.32 Al-Kind¬ does not try thoroughly to
apply this principle to all divine attributes, but he explicitly
accepts it in the case of the attributes “one” and “agent.”33
Al-Kind¬’s argument engages with a Mu‘tazilite problematic,
and does what the Mu‘tazila typically sought to do: reject any
theory of divine discourse that would require a plurality of
attributes co-eternal with God, while nevertheless affirming the
truth of the statement that “God is one,” for instance. His
terminology also reflects Mu‘tazilite concerns: the contrast
between the metaphorical and non-metaphorical use of words,
which grows out of the study of Arabic grammar that inspired so
much of Mu‘tazilite theology, was used for similar purposes by
the Mu‘tazila and other mutakallim‚n. Mu‘ammar ibn ‘Abb®d
al-Sulam¬ is said to have held that God has a word “not in truth
(f¬ al-Ωaqiyya) but only metaphorically (‘al® al-maj®z),”34 and 
the same contrast was used by the early theologian Jahm ibn
—afw®n.35 In part al-Kind¬’s solution to the problem of divine
attributes agrees with the Mu‘tazila, by associating the attributes
with God’s “self” or “essence” (dh®t). But he reaches this result
on the basis of an analysis of non-divine predication that owes a
great deal to Aristotle and Porphyry’s Isagoge. He also leaves
32 This argument is similar to Plato’s argument for the Forms, which are supposed
to exclude their contraries, unlike the sensible particulars that participate in the Forms.
Interestingly al-Kind¬’s view seems to reverse what we find in texts produced in his
own circle of translators: the Theology of Aristotle seeks to guarantee divine
transcendence by asserting that God, rather than creatures, is both F and not-F. See
my The Arabic Plotinus, chapter 5.
33 Why these two attributes? While any answer would be speculative, it is striking
that the two attributes seem to stem from the two philosophical traditions that most
influenced al-Kind¬: he has from Neoplatonism (especially the Theology) the claim that
God is one, and from Aristotle (as interpreted by Ammonius) the idea that God is an
efficient cause. But Aristotle could also be a source for the oneness of God: in
Metaphysics XII.10 he presents the Prime Mover as both one and the cause of the unity
of all things.
34 Daiber, Das theologisch-philosophische System des Mu‘ammar, p. 171. Cf.
W. Heinrichs, “On the genesis of the ºaq¬qa-Maj®z dichotomy,” Studia Islamica, 59
(1984): 111-40.
35 Jahm may even have been a source for al-Kind¬’s On the True Agent, because he
too held that God alone acts “f¬ al-Ωaq¬qa,” while humans only act “‘al® al-maj®z” (Al-
Ash‘ar¬, Maq®l®t al-isl®miyy¬n, 279.3-5 [VE XIV.6]). The parallel was already noticed
by Daiber, Das theologisch-philosophische System des Mu‘ammar, p. 375, footnote 5.
Note however that Jahm, who rejected human freedom, used the contrast to suggest
that humans are no more agents than the sun when it sets, while al-Kind¬ means
something quite different by saying that created things are metaphorically agents.
Indeed, as we will see, al-Kind¬ agrees with the Mu‘tazila, not Jahm, in ascribing
freedom to human agents.
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room for Aristotelian essential properties in the case of created
things, and builds on this to explain divine discourse. But to
safeguard the uniqueness of such discourse, he needs to stipulate
that God alone possesses attributes in such a way as completely
to rule out their contraries. This treatment of divine attributes
shows al-Kind¬ responding to the Mu‘tazila and even agreeing
with them in spirit. Yet it also shows him giving arguments based
on the tradition of falsafa rather than kal®m, and expanding on
that tradition with a theory of his own devising.
II. CREATION
One of the obstacles to our understanding of the Mu‘tazila is the
fact that they devoted so much of their energy to theological
disputes that may seem to us impossibly recondite and technical.
A prime example is their debate over whether the “non-existent
(ma‘d‚m)” is a “thing (shay’).”36 The question seems to have been
first formulated explicitly by Ab‚ Ya‘q‚b al-ShaΩΩ®m, a disciple
of Ab‚ al-Hudhayl. Al-ShaΩΩ®m said that the non-existent is
indeed a thing.37 To understand what he meant by this we need
to consider the status of the things God creates, prior to His
creating them. Insofar as these things have not yet been created,
they are “non-existent.” Yet one might think that God knows
things about them even before He creates them: the fact that He
will create them, for example. This suggests that, before things
are created, they are already things, for they are objects of God’s
knowledge, and an object of knowledge must be a thing.38 Arguing
against the view of the early theologian Hish®m ibn al-ºakam,39
36 For general discussion of the issue see J. van Ess, Die Erkenntnislehre des
‘A¥udadd¬n al-¡c¬ (Wiesbaden, 1966), pp. 191ff; R.M. Frank, “Remarks on the early
development of the Kalam,” Atti del Terzo Congresso di Studi Arabi e Islamici (Napoli,
1967), pp. 315-29, especially at pp. 324-5; R.M. Frank, “Al-Ma‘d‚m wal-Mawj‚d: the
non-existent, the existent, and the possible in the teaching of Ab‚ H®shim and his
followers,” MIDEO, 14 (1980): 185-209; F. Klein-Franke, “The non-existent is a thing,”
Le Muséon, 107 (1994): 375-90. On the related discussion of “thingness” and the
relation between shay’ and wuj‚d in Avicenna, see T.-A. Druart, “Shay’ or Res as
concomitant of ‘being’ in Avicenna,” Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica
Medievale, 12 (2001): 125-42, and R. Wisnovsky, “Notes on Avicenna’s concept of
thingness (shay’iyya),” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 10 (2000): 181-221.
37 Al-Ash‘ar¬, Maq®l®t al-isl®miyy¬n, 505.1-2 [VE XXVI.1]. Cf. VE XXVI.3.
38 Ibid., 162.8-12 [VE XXVI.2].
39 Ibid., 37.8-10; 493.15-494.1 [VE IV.39].
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Ab‚ al-Hudhayl had already staked out the Mu‘tazilite view on
this issue by insisting that God does indeed know things before
He creates them. He even added that those things must have a
“limit (nih®ya),” because God knows that He will create a finite
world.40 But he did not, so far as we know, develop this into the
explicit claim that the non-existent is a thing. Still, in making
that claim al-ShaΩΩ®m seems merely to have been drawing the
logical consequence of Ab‚ al-Hudhayl’s argument.
Another way of putting the point, emphasized by Richard
Frank,41 is to say that before something exists it is still possible,
and that the possible is something, not nothing. In this case the
argument proceeds from God’s prior power, rather than His prior
knowledge. God’s creating something is His actualizing its
possibility for existing. This suggests that, if God is eternally able
to create something, then there is an eternal possibility for that
thing. One can make this claim without saying, in contemporary
parlance, that creation is the actualization of a possible world,
where the possible world is understood as one of many options
possible in themselves and external to God Himself. That would,
again, compromise tawΩ¬d, because the possibilities of things
would be co-eternal with God. Rather, Ab‚ al-Hudhayl regarded
the possibilities of things as residing in God’s power (qudra),
rather than as external objects of that power.
Combining the two arguments, we can say that God knows that
things are possible by knowing His own power. Thus Ab‚ al-
Hudhayl says that in one sense God’s knowledge is infinite,
because He knows Himself, while in another it is finite, because
by knowing Himself He knows the limited world He will create.42
This solution was not universally accepted by the Mu‘tazila. For
instance, Hish®m ibn ‘Amr al-Fuwafl¬, another student of Ab‚ al-
Hudhayl’s, denied that the non-existent is a thing prior to its
creation, but maintained that this did not compromise God’s
knowledge.43 Presumably he did so precisely because he was
concerned that possibles would in fact be both eternal and distinct
40 Al-Khayy®fl, Kit®b al-Inti◊®r, 16.2-10.
41 See Frank, “Al-Ma‘d‚m wal-Mawj‚d,” p. 190: “al-ShaΩΩ®m was solely concerned
with the question of the possible.”
42 Again, see al-Khayy®fl, Kit®b al-Inti◊®r, 16.2-10.
43 Al-Khayy®fl, Kit®b al-Inti◊®r, 50.3-5: “The dissent of Hish®m al-Fuwafl¬ on this
point is about what to call the objects of knowledge: are they ‘things (ashy®’),’ prior to
their generation (kawn), or not? But about whether God is knowing or not, he did not
[disagree].”
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from God, if they were ashy®’. Yet the majority view, elaborated
in the later tradition, was that the possible or non-existent is
indeed a thing, and an object of God’s knowledge and power.
Non-being also figures prominently in al-Kind¬’s treatment of
creation. He says that all generation may be defined as “bringing
being to be from non-being” (FP 118.18 [RJ 33.25]). Creation is
a special case of this: in his compilation of philosophical
definitions, he defines al-ibd®‘, creation or origination, as “the
manifestation (i˙h®r) of the thing (al-shay’) from non-being (‘an
lays).”44 A much fuller exposition of the mechanism of creation
may be found, rather unexpectedly, in a digression from al-
Kind¬’s summary of the Aristotelian corpus.45 The digression
takes the form of an exegesis of a passage from s‚ra 36 of the
Qur’®n, and is intended to show the superiority of prophetic
knowledge (or at least, the way knowledge is expressed in
prophetic texts) over philosophical knowledge.46 Richard Walzer
has already mentioned this passage in connection with the
Mu‘tazila, because it shows al-Kind¬ taking their rationalist
approach to interpretation of the Qur’®n.47 But here I am
interested not so much in the fact that al-Kind¬ is using an
interpretation of the Qur’®n as an opportunity to expound a
theory of creation, as I am interested in the theory itself.
In the passage from the Qur’®n quoted by al-Kind¬, the
unbelievers ask: “who will revivify the bones, when they are
decayed?” The response is as follows: “say that He will revivify
them Who first brought them forth at one time, and Who knows
44 F¬ Ωud‚d al-ashy®’ wa rus‚mih® (On the Definitions and Descriptions of Things),
al-Kind¬, Ras®’il al-Kind¬ al-falsafiyya, 165-179, at 165.11. For this treatise see
F. Klein-Franke, “Al-Kind¬’s ‘On Definitions and Descriptions of Things’,” Le Muséon:
Revue des études orientales, 95 (1982): 191-216; also M. Allard, “L’Épître de Kind¬ sur
les Définitions,” Bulletin d’études orientales de l’Institut français de Damas, 25 (1972):
47-83. Less easily available but extremely useful is T. Frank, Al-Kind¬’s “Book of
Definitions”: its Place in Arabic Definition Literature (unpublished PhD dissertation,
Yale University, 1975), which traces the sources of many of the definitions. In what
follows I will refer to the work simply as On Definitions. See below, footnote 87, for the
authenticity of this work.
45 R. f¬ kammiyyat Kutub Arisfl‚fl®l¬s wa m® yuΩt®ju ilayhi f¬ taΩ◊¬l al-falsafa (On the
Quantity of the Books of Aristotle and What is Required for the Attainment of
Philosophy), al-Kind¬, Ras®’il al-Kind¬ al-falsafiyya, 363-84. An earlier edition, with a
translation into Italian, is M. Guidi and R. Walzer, Uno Scritto Introduttivo allo Studio
di Aristotele (Rome, 1940).
46 I take it to be significant that al-Kind¬ praises MuΩammad’s statement as being
superior to philosophy in its brevity and clarity (373.14), but not necessarily in its
content.
47 Walzer, Greek into Arabic, pp. 177ff.
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all creation. He struck fire from the green trees, and from it you
strike fire. Or is He who created the heavens and the earth unable
to create their like? Surely, He is the Creator (al-kh®liq), the
knowing. When He wills something (shay’an), His command is to
say to it: ‘Be!’ and it is” (373.18-374.1, 374.11-12, 375.6-8, and
375.16-17, citing Qur’®n 36.78-82). Al-Kind¬’s interprets the
passage piece by piece. He first points out a flaw in the
unbeliever’s position:
The questioner, who does not believe in the power of God, the great and
exalted, must nevertheless admit that something is (k®na) after not having
been (lam yakun), and that his bones formerly were not – they were non-
existent (ma‘d‚m) – but now must necessarily be, after not having been [that
is, presumably, because the unbeliever’s bones must exist for him to have
asked the question in the first place]. (374.6-8)
The relevance of this for the problem debated by the Mu‘tazila is
clear: we have a thing, in this case the opponent’s bones, that was
formerly ma‘d‚m but is now something that exists. How is this
possible? 
Al-Kind¬ takes his cue from the mention of the production of
fire from the trees: 
For He made fire from not-fire (ja‘ala min l® n®rin n®ran), or heat from not-
heat. Thus something is necessarily generated from its contrary. For if what
comes to be (al-Ω®dith) did not come to be from the substance (‘ayn) of its
contrary, and if there is no intermediary between the two contraries – by
“contrary” I mean “it” and “not-it” (huwa wa l® huwa) – it would have to come
to be from itself (min dh®tihi). But then its essence (dh®t) is always fixed,
eternal and without48 beginning. For, if dryness does not come from not-fire,
then it must come from fire, so that fire will come from fire, and [this] fire from
[another] fire, and inevitably there will endlessly (sarmadan) and eternally be
fire from fire and fire from fire. Therefore fire would always exist, and there
would never be a state (Ω®l) where it is not (hiya laysun). Thus there would
never be fire after there was no fire. But fires do exist (mawj‚da) after not
being (lam takun), and are destroyed after existing. So the only remaining
possibility is that fire is generated from not-fire, and that every generation is
from what is other than itself. So everything that is generated is generated
from “not-it” (l® huwa). (374.12-375.5)
Al-Kind¬’s central point is one with a long heritage: all change or
generation is from contraries.49 Fire, for example, is dry, so it
must come from something not-dry. This principle goes back at
48 Adding l® with both editions.
49 Compare FP 113.13: “Every change is only into its most proximate contrary.”
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least as far as Plato’s Phaedo (70e-72a), but al-Kind¬ more likely
has in mind the account of change in Aristotle’s Physics (I.7-8, cf.
Categories 10). He agrees with Aristotle that, whenever some-
thing comes to be F, it comes to be from not-F; or, as he says here,
huwa comes to be from l® huwa.
Yet al-Kind¬ goes on to apply this principle in a most un-
Aristotelian way, arguing that if something comes to be – not
comes to be a certain way, but comes to be simpliciter – then it
too must come from a contrary state. That is, it will come to be
from a state that is contrary to being. This state is the state of
non-being, to which al-Kind¬ has already referred, using not only
‘adam and negations of the verb k®na, but also his characteristic
terminology of lays (non-being) as opposed to ays (being).50 He
sets out his view as follows:
In their hearts the unbelievers denied the creation of the heavens, because
what they believed about the period of time needed for their creation was based
on an analogy with the acts of mankind. For, in the case of human acts, the
greater the work produced (‘amal), the longer is the period [of time] required,
so that for [humans] the greatest of sensible things [i.e. the heavens] would
take the longest amount of time to produce. So then, [God] said that He, great
be His praise, needs no period [of time] to originate. And this is clear, because
He made “it” from “not-it” (ja‘ala huwa min l® huwa). If His power (qudra)
is such that it can produce (ya‘malu) bodies from not-bodies, and bring being
out of non-being (akhraja aysan min laysin), then, since He is able (q®dir) to
perform a deed with no material substrate (min l® fl¬natin), He does not need
to produce (ya‘malu) in time. For, since there can be no act (fi‘l) of mankind
without a material substrate, the act that does not need to act upon a material
substrate has no need of time. “When He wills something, His command is to
say to it: ‘Be!’ and it is.” That is, He only wills, and together with His will is
generated that which He wills – great be His praise, and exalted His names
above the opinions of the unbelievers! (375.9-18)
This passage gathers together numerous points about creation.
Several of these points have to do with al-Kind¬’s famous rejection
of the world’s eternity, to which I have already alluded in section
(I). His claim that the world is made in no time and without a
material substrate (fl¬na) is intended to mark the distinctiveness
of creation as opposed to other kinds of change or causation.
Creation is contrasted especially to human causation, as al-Kind¬
makes clear by charging the unbelievers with failing to
distinguish divine action from human action. 
50 On this terminology see my “Before essence and existence: Al-Kind¬’s conception
of being,” The Journal of the History of Philosophy, 40 (2002): 297-312, at p. 300.
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These distinctive features of creation – that it requires no
material cause and no time – are carefully chosen. In Physics
VIII.1, Aristotle had argued for the eternity of the world precisely
on the assumption that if the world were generated, the
generation of the world (like other changes or motions) would be
the actualization of something potential (dunaton), in other
words a material substrate (251a10-11). Furthermore, argued
Aristotle, as a change or motion this generation will occur in time,
so that there will be a moment prior to the change. If there is
always a prior moment, then time itself is eternal, which Aristotle
takes to show that the world is eternal after all (251b10-18), since
time is the measure of motion. Al-Kind¬ is, then, arguing precisely
against Aristotle’s conception, on which the generation of the
world would be a change like other change.
He is not, however, the first philosopher to reject Aristotle’s
arguments on this point. It is well known that John Philoponus,
the 6th-century Christian commentator, attacked Aristotle in a
work now lost except for fragments preserved in Simplicius and
a few other sources, some of them Arabic.51 It is also well known
that al-Kind¬ drew on this work in his arguments against the
eternity of the world in FP.52 But it has not, to my knowledge,
been noticed before that the passage we have been examining
from On the Quantity of the Books of Aristotle is also directly
dependent on Philoponus, as the following parallels show:
Al-Kind¬, 374.15-374.4: For, if dryness does not come from not-fire, then it
must come from fire, so that fire will come from fire, and [this] fire from
[another] fire, and inevitably there will endlessly and eternally be fire from
fire and fire from fire. Therefore fire would always exist, and there would never
be a state where it is not. Thus there would never be fire after there was no
fire. But fires do exist after not being, and are destroyed after existing. So the
only remaining possibility is that fire is generated from not-fire, and that every
generation is from what is other than itself.
Philoponus, fragment 120 [1151.8-16]: Just as this matter has become fire
from some prior, underlying fire (proupokeimenou puros), and the latter from
yet another [fire], [and just as] it is possible to stop ascending at some point
51 See Philoponus, Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, translated by
C. Wildberg (London, 1987). The Greek text is in Simplicius, Commentary on the
Physics, edited by H. Diels (Berlin, 1895). Translations from this work are modified
versions of those given by Wildberg; I cite by Wildberg’s fragment number followed by
page and line citations from the Diels edition.
52 See H.A. Davidson, “John Philoponus as a source of medieval, Islamic and Jewish
proofs of creation,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, 89 (1969): 357-91.
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at some fire that did not come to be from some other fire when its matter was
kindled, but [came to be] due to friction or due to some other cause, but not
from fire at any rate, so it is equally not impossible to see the same happening
also in the case of the generation of things from one another. Now, whatever
is generated by nature is the result of generation of one thing from another,
but it is nevertheless possible that they possess a beginning of existence, and
that there is some first thing in each kind of case that did not attain generation
from some pre-existing (prouparchontos) thing, either similar or dissimilar.
Al-Kind¬, 375.13-15: If His power is such that it can produce bodies from not-
bodies, and bring being out of non-being, then, since He is able to perform a
deed with no material substrate, He does not need to produce in time.
Philoponus, fragment 119 [1150.23-25]: If God produces in the same way as
nature, He will not be different from nature. [Thus] He has created the matter
of bodies out of not-being (ek m∂ onto¯n), for He certainly did not [create them]
out of a substrate.
The parallels are not quite precise, as one might expect given that
both texts may relate to Philoponus only indirectly: quoted by the
hostile Simplicius on the one hand, and on the other transmitted
to al-Kind¬ via an Arabic translation and then presumably
paraphrased by al-Kind¬ for use in this context. But they seem to
show something quite remarkable: that al-Kind¬ was using the
work of the Christian Philoponus as part of an interpretation of
the Qur’®n. (Fortuitously, Philoponus’ example of the production
of fire – an example that also appears in Aristotle (251a15-16) in
the text Philoponus is attacking – provides al-Kind¬ with an
opportunity to bring Philoponus’ remarks directly in contact with
the Qur’®nic text on God’s creation of fire from the trees.) The
passages on which al-Kind¬ draws here come from Book VI of
Philoponus’ attack on Aristotle, a Book designed expressly to
refute Aristotle’s argument in Physics VIII.1. This explains why
al-Kind¬ fastens onto the issues of the material substrate and of
time: these are the issues raised in Aristotle’s discussion and in
Philoponus’ refutation.
The other purpose of Philoponus’ Book VI is to argue for the
possibility of creation out of “not-being (m∂ on).”53 Indeed the
second of the two Philoponus quotations I have just given is
preceded by Philoponus’ remark that “if nature creates
(d∂miourgei) out of things that are (onto¯n), it is not necessary
that God does so as well. For if the world did not exist always,
clearly God created it out of not-being” (119 [1150.21-23]). This
53 Fragments 116 [1142.3, 13-16, 21], 119 [1150.23, 25], 131 [1177.25].
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takes us back to al-Kind¬’s identical claim that what is created
comes from the contrary of being, which is non-being (lays).
Despite all the disanalogies between creation and more typical
change, creation still obeys the law that all change is a change
from one contrary to another. Non-being (the thing that does not
yet exist) is thus that out of which God creates.
Although al-Kind¬ draws on Philoponus to reach this con-
clusion, the passage is more than a recapitulation of a Greek
source. For one thing, the elaboration of the argument from
contraries seems to be al-Kind¬’s own, as it is not based on
anything we find in Philoponus. This is central to al-Kind¬’s
argument, and shows him developing a strategy much like that
of Philoponus: using Aristotle against himself. For another thing,
other features of the argument show that, although al-Kind¬ has
in mind the work of his Greek, Christian ally Philoponus, he is
also thinking of the contemporary debate amongst the Mu‘tazila.
In fact I would argue that he is here giving the same answer as
did al-ShaΩΩ®m to the question of whether non-being is a thing.
He answers that it is, because non-being must serve as the
contrary to which created being is opposed. This was already
suggested by the definition we saw al-Kind¬ give of creation (“the
manifestation of the thing from non-being”) in On Definitions.54
It is confirmed by what al-Kind¬ goes on to say at the end of the
passage we have been studying: that God’s command “Be!” is
addressed, using the second person, to non-being (idh laysun
mukh®flabun).
I need to defend my interpretation of this passage, because the
meaning of the Arabic is disputed.55 The best evidence for my
interpretation, apart from the fact that it is suggested by the
54 Here it is not only the term “thing (shay’)” that suggests the parallel with the
Mu‘tazilite position, but the term “manifestation (i˙h®r).” ¯ahara, “come to light,”
“appear,” has the connotation that what was hidden has been revealed, which might
suggest that “the thing” was already something, namely something hidden (in God’s
power?), before being created.
55 I follow Ab‚ R¬da in understanding l-y-s as a noun (see his footnote 8 on page 375)
rather than a verb, and reading mukh®flab (“is spoken to”) rather than mukh®flib (“is
speaking”). Jolivet, L’intellect selon Kind¬, p. 107 footnote 5, also agrees with this
reading. Here one should compare the two published translations of the work, that in
Guidi and Walzer, Uno Scritto Introduttivo, and the Spanish translation in R.R.
Guerrero and E.T. Poveda, Obras Filosoficas de al-Kind¬ (Madrid, 1986). Guidi and
Walzer render it: “Iddio non rivolge la parola direttamente ad alcuno” (reading
mukh®flib, evidently), and Guerrero and Poveda translate: “aquí se interpola a lo que
no tiene capacidad de ser interpelado.”
64 PETER ADAMSON
context of the argument about non-being as the contrary of being,
is that there is a close precedent for the thought I am attributing
to al-Kind¬. This time the source is not Greek, but Mu‘tazilite:
Ab‚ al-Hudhayl said that the creation of a thing, [which is] its being-brought-
to-be (takw¬n) after it was not, is distinct from it [sc. the created thing]. It [sc.
the creation] is God’s willing it and saying to it, “Be!” […] God’s originating
something (al-shay’) after it was not is its creation.56
Note that Ab‚ al-Hudhayl’s claim that God need only will
something immediately to create what He wills has also just been
asserted by al-Kind¬ (“He only wills, and together with His will
is generated that which He wills,” cited above).57 Al-Kind¬ goes
on to explain that, while strictly speaking it makes no sense to
speak to non-being in the second person, Arabic speakers often
“use [expressions] about the thing that do not belong to it by
nature” (376.1). As Walzer noted, the appeal to a metaphorical
interpretation here is similar to hermeneutic strategies used by
the Mu‘tazila.58 Thus the end of the digression features numerous
points of overlap with the Mu‘tazila. For our purposes the most
important such point is that non-being, i.e. that which has not
yet been created, is the recipient of God’s creative act.
My interpretation is also bolstered by what al-Kind¬ says else-
where: in a work on the nature of the heavens to be discussed more
fully in section (III) below, al-Kind¬ remarks that, “because [God’s]
power is bringing (ikhr®j) the ma‘®n¬ into existence (kawn), it
creates all substances, both simple and composed.”59 I hesitate to
translate the technical term ma‘®n¬ (also found in Mu‘tazilite
contexts, but used differently) for fear of prejudging the correct
interpretation. Rashed and Jolivet propose “ideas,” and Ab‚ R¬da
(footnote 7 ad loc) suggests that they are objects of God’s
knowledge. I believe that al-Kind¬ uses it to refer to possibilities
or potentialities that are actualized by God’s creative act.60 The
56 Al-Ash‘ar¬, Maq®l®t al-isl®miyy¬n, 363.10-11, 363.15-364.1 [VE XXI.100].
57 See further Walzer, Greek into Arabic, p. 183, and Jolivet, L’intellect selon Kind¬,
p. 110.
58 Walzer, Greek into Arabic, pp. 182-3, and Guidi and Walzer, Uno Scritto
Introduttivo, p. 388. 
59 Kit®b f¬ al-ib®na ‘an al-‘illa al-f®‘ila al-qar¬ba li-al-kawn wa al-fas®d (On the
Explanation of the Proximate, Agent Cause of Generation and Corruption), 244-261 [RJ
177-199], at 257.10 [RJ 195.6-7]. Cited by Jolivet, L’intellect selon Kind¬, pp. 122-3,
also in the context of discussing the relationship between al-Kind¬ and the Mu‘tazila. 
60 The basis of my interpretation of this sentence as a reference to the actualization
of possibilities is the word ikhr®j. Al-Kind¬ uses the verb kharaja as a technical term,
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same view might also be inferred from a passage in FP where al-
Kind¬ characterizes the eternal as follows:
The eternal (al-azal¬) is what must not have been non-existent61 in any respect
(mufllaqan). For the eternal has nothing existing prior to its being (l® qabla
kawniyya li-huwiyyatihi). (113.1-2 [RJ 27.8-9])
This may be compared to his definition of the eternal in On
Definitions: “‘Eternal (al-azal¬)’: that which was never was not”
(169.10), and the characterizations of creation we have already
seen above (the manifestation or bringing-to-be of being from
non-being, lays). Something that is not eternal, that is, something
that was not, is preceded by non-being. Creation is nothing but
the granting of being or existence (variously expressed as kawn,
wuj‚d, huwiyya, ays) to such a thing. His agreement with the
Mu‘tazila on this point is significant, as is the philosophical
argument he gives for the point in his interpretation of Qur’®n
36: an interpretation that draws on Greek philosophy to prove a
Mu‘tazilite point of view.62
III. FREEDOM
Perhaps the most notorious doctrine held by the Mu‘tazila is their
affirmation of human freedom.63 Indeed this is treated as some-
thing of a litmus test for inclusion in the Mu‘tazilite “school.” Al-
Ash‘ar¬ says that Øir®r ibn ‘Amr, who agreed with the Mu‘tazila
on many points, cannot be counted as Mu‘tazilite because he
diverged from them (f®raqa) in holding that human actions are
created by God rather than by human agents.64 The Mu‘tazila
believed that human freedom is a necessary condition for divine
meaning “to emerge [into actuality].” See for example al-Kind¬, Ras®’il al-Kind¬ al-
falsafiyya, 246.4-5 [RJ 179.14-15], 250.4, 8 [RJ 185.9, 12], 251.13, 17 [RJ 187.11, 14],
268.18. The same verb is used for creation in the passage we studied from On the
Quantity of Aristotle’s Books, at p. 375.13.
61 Following the interpretation of Ivry.
62 The situation may be more complicated still, given that there is some evidence that
the Mu‘tazila (especially al-Na˙˙®m) themselves drew on Philoponus’ Against Aristotle
in their arguments against the eternity of the world. See Davidson, “John Philoponus,”
pp. 375-6, 379. 
63 On this see D. Gimaret, Théories de l’acte humain en théologie musulmane (Paris,
1980).
64 Al-Ash‘ar¬, Maq®l®t al-isl®miyy¬n, 281.2-5 [VE XV.13]. Al-Khayy®fl, Kit®b al-
Inti◊®r, 98.4-5, excludes him from the Mu‘tazila in part for the same reason.
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justice (‘adl). Part of the point here is that God commands good
and forbids evil, and will reward the believers and punish
wrongdoers. He cannot do any of this justly unless we choose to
believe or do wrong freely.65 Equally central is the idea that God
does not (or even cannot) act unjustly,66 and thus cannot be the
author or agent of the unjust human action. In addition, the
Mu‘tazila thought it simply obvious that we act freely, that is,
that we possess a power to exercise choice (ikhtiy®r).
Thus determining what al-Kind¬ has to say on the subject of
human freedom is of paramount importance for understanding
his relation to the Mu‘tazila. Unfortunately any works al-Kind¬
devoted specifically to the topic have been lost.67 Still, we can
reconstruct his position to some extent from what survives. The
most direct evidence is to be found in his work On Definitions.
Early in the work, al-Kind¬ provides us with the following
definition:
“Choice (al-ikhtiy®r)”: volition (ir®da) preceded by deliberation (rawiyya)
together with discrimination (tamy¬z) (167.1).
Two of the terms used in this definition of choice are themselves
defined shortly thereafter:
“Deliberation (rawiyya)”: wavering (im®la) between inclinations68 in the soul
(168.1).
“Volition (ir®da)”: a power (quwwa) by which one intends (yaq◊idu) one thing
rather than another (168.7).
These definitions suggest that al-Kind¬ believes that humans have
a power of free choice. The possibility that such a power belongs
only to God is in fact already diminished by the idea that choice
65 See the discussion of this argument in Gimaret, Théories de l’acte humain,
pp. 252ff. Sometimes the argument is made without reference to divine justice: it is
simply incoherent to imagine a command being given to an agent who cannot freely
follow the command. See below for al-Kind¬’s acceptance of this claim.
66 On the debate whether God can act unjustly, even though He does not, see for
example the report of al-Na˙˙®m’s view at al-Khayy®fl, Kit®b al-Inti◊®r, sections 24-25.
67 See above, footnote 11.
68 Reading khaw®flir,with Klein-Franke, “Al-Kind¬’s ‘On Definitions and Descriptions
of Things’,” p. 211 (number 22), and Frank, Al-Kind¬’s “Book of Definitions”, p. 81.
See just below for al-Kind¬’s definition of kh®flir, which is a second stage after conceiving
a “thought (s®niΩ).” The contrast seems to be between an idle thought and an actual
tendency towards doing something. For instance, one sees an apple, and becomes aware
that one could eat the apple, which is a “thought.” Only then does one form the further
“inclination” actually to eat the apple. Then one “deliberates” about whether to follow
this inclination, or a rival inclination not to eat the apple.
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involves rawiyya, or deliberation, which according to other Kind¬
circle texts plays no part in divine action.69 In any case the
freedom of created beings is explicitly embraced by al-Kind¬ later
on in the text:
“Volition of the creature (ir®dat al-makhl‚q)”: the faculty of the soul (quwwa
nafs®niyya) that goes towards an action due to a thought (s®niΩ) (175.13-14).
Clearly it is imperative for us to understand this last definition,
since it so clearly asserts the reality of human volition. We can
begin by noting that it is the culmination of a series of definitions
that establish a causal sequence in the process of human will.
First the agent has a “thought (s®niΩ),” which gives rise to an
“inclination (kh®flir)” (175.7). The decision causes a “will” or
“volition” (ir®da) (175.8). Ir®da is in turn the cause of isti‘m®l,
which given the context would seem to mean “action.”70 It will be
worthwhile to look more closely at the definition of isti‘m®l:
Its cause is the volition. It may also be the cause for further inclinations
(kh®flar®t). So there is a causal circle (dawr) that attends on all of these causes,
[which] are the act of the Creator (fi‘l al-b®ri’). Therefore we say that the
Creator, may He be exalted, makes some of His creatures be thoughts
(saw®niΩ) for others, makes some to be actualized (mustakhraja)71 by others,
and makes some to be moved by others (175.9-12).
What is most striking about this passage is the suggestion that
our actions are part of a cyclical causal process (dawr), which I
take to mean that after thoughts and inclinations cause volitions
that cause actions, these actions then cause further thoughts and
inclinations, and the process is repeated. All the stages in the
cycle, furthermore, are said to be caused by God. Thus it would
seem that our actions are in fact determined in two ways. First,
they are part of a causally determined sequence or cycle. Most
immediately they are caused by thoughts and inclinations, and
these are not obviously under our causal control.72 Second, the
69 See especially the Theology of Aristotle, edited as Plotinus apud Arabes by
‘A. Badaw¬ (Cairo, 1955), at pp. 67.4, 119.12, 140.9.
70 The use of this term may correspond to khr∂sis in his Greek source, if Frank, Al-
Kind¬’s “Book of Definitions”, p. 58, is right in seeing John of Damascus as that source.
71 See above, footnote 60.
72 Perhaps al-Kind¬ means that my own choices eventually lead to my own decisions,
which then cause further choices: a circular explanation, but is it deterministic?
Presumably our thoughts and inclinations are frequently caused by an external factor:
my thought that I might eat an apple is occasioned by seeing an apple, the thought
causes an inclination to eat it, which causes the volition to eat it. One might think that
my volition will be undetermined as long as my decision stems from a prior volition of
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whole network of causes of which our actions form a part is itself
caused by God. The upshot is that al-Kind¬ is accepting both of
the sorts of causal determinism that might compromise human
freedom: our actions are determined both by events in the created
world and by divine agency.73
If this is right, then how can al-Kind¬ nevertheless affirm that
we have a power of volition and choice? I believe that he is taking
a position that is now known as compatibilism: the view that
human actions can be both free and determined. There was
certainly precedent for compatibilism in the Greek tradition,
especially in the Stoics, whose view could have been known to 
al-Kind¬ through Peripatetic criticisms if through no other route
(though I think it is doubtful that there was significant Stoic
influence on al-Kind¬). Admittedly, the evidence adduced thus far
for this interpretation is slight, but I will now try to show that
other surviving passages where al-Kind¬ mentions freedom can
best be understood if we hold that he was, indeed, a compatibilist.
First it should be briefly noted that statements by two of al-
Kind¬’s students lend some support to this hypothesis. His
disciple al-Sharakhs¬ affirms both the reality of human freedom
and its link to “discernment”: “discerning actions occur through
the volition of the one who chooses (al-af‘®lu al-tamy¬ziyyatu
my own (e.g. my prior resolution to eat more apples), but of course this is only the case
if that volition itself was undetermined. What is needed to avoid determinism is the
claim that sometimes volitions happen without being caused at all, but al-Kind¬ seems
to deny precisely that in his definitions. I here speak of determinism as including the
claim that causes necessitate their effects, since al-Kind¬ seems to conceive of causes
in this way, as will become clear in the cosmological context explored below. This should
not be taken to imply that al-Kind¬ is a logical determinist, however: I believe he would
accept that unactualized actions are logically only possible, though it is causally
necessitated that an alternative action is chosen. On this see the discussion of modality
in the final section of my “Ab‚ Ma‘shar, al-Kind¬ and the philosophical defense of
astrology,” Recherches de philosophie et théologie médiévale, 69 (2002): 245-70.
73 Frank, Al-Kind¬’s “Book of Definitions”, claims that al-Kind¬’s definitions on this
topic are based ultimately on the Expositio fidei of John of Damascus (whereas Klein-
Franke, “Al-Kind¬’s ‘On Definitions and Descriptions of Things’,” p. 202, compares the
first definition of ikhtiy®r to a passage in Andronicus of Rhodes). I cannot assess this
claim here, and will say only that Frank seems right at least in finding a structural
similarity between the two accounts. At any rate the following both seem to be the case:
(a) the various definitions on human action and freedom are derived from Greek
sources, yet (b) the crucial section of the definition of isti‘m®l, beginning in the second
sentence of my translation, is al-Kind¬’s own addition rather than a recapitulation of
his Greek source (Frank, Al-Kind¬’s “Book of Definitions”, p. 138, says that the
definition is “greatly expanded” from what can be found in John of Damascus).
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w®qi‘atun bi-ir®dati al-mukht®ri).”74 And the reknowned astrol-
ogerAb‚Ma‘shar, who according to the Fihrist took up philosophy
thanks to al-Kind¬, does not just say that humans are free; he does
so with an argument that I have elsewhere argued is com-
patibilist.75 His position is set out in the first book of the Mudkhal
al-kab¬r ‘il® ‘ilm aΩk®m al-nuj‚m (Great Introduction to the
Science of Astrology).76 It appears as the response to an objection,
that if astrology is capable of predicting human actions, then
those actions must be predetermined and not free. Ab‚ Ma‘shar
admits the antecedent of this argument:
Just as the stars indicate the possibility and choice that belong to a man, so
they indicate that a man will only choose what the stars indicate, because his
choice of a thing or its opposite will be by the rational soul whose mixture with
the animal soul in individuals is determined by the indications of the stars.
(I.860-2, my emphasis)
But he nonetheless insists that we are free, and indeed that our
capacity for choice (ikhtiy®r) is what distinguishes us from the
other animals (see I.739-40).
The best evidence for al-Kind¬’s compatibilism also comes from
the realm of astrology and cosmology. In his treatise explaining
why the Qur’®n claims that the heavens “bow down” and are
obedient before God, al-Kind¬ says the following:
The meaning of “obedience” is “execution of the order of a commander.” Now,
execution of the order of a commander is only by choice (ikhtiy®r), and choice
belongs to complete souls, that is, rational [souls]. Therefore the stars… are
endowed with obedience.77
Before remarking on the philosophical significance of this, let me
point out two features of the passage that suggest parallels with
the Mu‘tazila. First, as we saw above, the Mu‘tazila often argued
that if God commands His creatures to do a thing, then this
presupposes freedom on the part of the creatures.78 Second, the
74 F. Rosenthal, AΩmad b. afl-fiayyib as-Sharakhs¬ (New Haven, 1943), p. 134; cited
at Frank, Al-Kind¬’s “Book of Definitions”, p. 59.
75 See my “Ab‚ Ma‘shar, al-Kind¬ and the philosophical defense of astrology.”
76 Ab‚ Ma‘shar al-Balkh¬, Liber introductorii maioris ad scientiam judicorum
astrorum, edited by R. Lemay (Naples, 1995-6). I have been greatly helped by Charles
Burnett’s forthcoming English translation.
77 Ris®la f¬ al-ib®na ‘an suj‚d al-jirm al-aq◊® (On the Explanation of the Bowing of
the Outermost Body), in al-Kind¬, Ras®’il al-Kind¬ al-falsafiyya, 244-261 [RJ 176-199],
at 246.7-247.13 [RJ 179.17-23].
78 For Ab‚ al-Hudhayl’s definition of obedience as acting in accordance with a divine
command (amr), see al-Khayy®fl, Kit®b al-Inti◊®r, 58.23-59.1.
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ability to choose further presupposes that what obeys has a soul.
This claim can be found in the Mu‘tazilite author al-N®shi’: “the
freely chosen act (al-fi‘l al-ihktiy®r¬) can come only from the soul
of the agent.”79 These reminiscences, and the entire context of
the treatise as a philosophical account of a Qur’®nic verse, suggest
that al-Kind¬ is again in dialogue with or at least conscious of the
Mu‘tazila as he explains the freedom exercised by the heavenly
bodies.
In what does this freedom consist? In On Definitions, we saw that
a choice (ikhtiy®r) requires not only that one form a volition, but
that it be formed in the right way, that is, on the basis of a process
of deliberation and discernment (tamy¬z). In the case of heavenly
motion, al-Kind¬ once again links free choice to discernment: the
heavenly body “is alive and discerning (mumayyiz), so it is clear that
its obedience is due to choice (ikhtiy®riyya)” (246.10 [RJ 181.10-
11]). The capacity for ikhtiy®r on the part of the heavens does not
seem to require that the heavens could do otherwise than to move
in accordance with God’s command. Indeed it is most unlikely that
al-Kind¬would accept this as a possibility, given that, as we will see
shortly, the heavens’ motion is the instrument of God’s providence,
which ought not to obtain only contingently. Their freedom seems
rather to consist in the fact that they obey God rationally. That is,
they perceive the reasons why it is necessary for them to move; it
is this that al-Kind¬ means by the term tamy¬z.
The ramifications of this for human freedom become clear in
al-Kind¬’s work On the Explanation of the Proximate, Agent Cause
of Generation and Corruption.80 In this treatise, which is intended
to establish the philosophical basis for the science of astrology,
al-Kind¬ explains that the stars bring about all generation and
corruption in the sublunar world by affecting heat, cold, dryness
and moisture in the elements and compounds of the elements. It
is through this influence that God’s providence is exercised:
79 J. van Ess, Frühe mu‘tazilitische Häresiographie (Beirut, 1971), 96.14-15 of the
Arabic edition. Al-N®shi’ was slightly later than al-Kind¬.
80 See above, footnote 59. The relevance of al-Kind¬’s astrological works for his views
on freedom is noted in T.-A. Druart, “Al-Kind¬’s ethics,” Review of Metaphysics, 47
(1993): 329-57, at pp. 344-7. She adds a passage from al-Kind¬’s On the Art of Dispelling
Sorrows that helps confirm his basic acceptance of human freedom. F. Jadaane, in his
L’influence du stoïcisme sur la pensée musulmane (Beirut, 1968), p. 200, claims that
for al-Kind¬ human acts are unfree because of the stars’ influence. He detects Stoic
influence in al-Kind¬, not only in Proximate, Agent Cause but also in his ethical works;
Jadaane does not, however, raise the question of whether al-Kind¬ was a compatibilist
like the Stoics.
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It has been made clear that the celestial bodies’ being in the place where they
are… is the proximate agent cause of generation and corruption in generated
and corrupted things. That is, by the volition (ir®da) of their Creator they give
rise to this order (tart¬b), which is the reason (sabab) for generation and
corruption. [It has also been made clear] that this is from the rule (tadb¬r) of
a wise, knowing, powerful, generous knower who perfects what He makes, and
that this rule is perfect in the extreme. For He necessitates the best command,
as has been made clear. (236.13-237.1)
Now, if al-Kind¬ were committed both to human freedom and to
incompatibilism, then he would have to insist that human actions
are immune to this sort of causal determination from the stars.
Instead, like Ab‚ Ma‘shar, he is happy to explain our general
moral character and our individual volitions as the results of
heavenly motion:
It is manifest that in the rotation [of the heavenly body] according to its orbit,
it apportions heat, cold, moisture and dryness [in] the bodies below it at all
times. [This leads] to the reception of the various kinds of characters of the
soul, and to the soul’s habits and its volitions (ir®d®t), in accordance with both
the more general mixtures that occur from [the celestial bodies], and the more
particular mixture of every one of the generated and corrupted things that are
under [the celestial bodies]. For this reason there occur intentions (himam)
distinct from initial intentions, and volitions distinct from initial volitions, and
this alters form (shakl) and practices. (236.1-5)
Admittedly, al-Kind¬ does not here explicitly claim that all human
actions and choices are brought about by the stars. Given further
evidence to be adduced shortly, I am convinced he does think this,
but it is not required for my argument. All that is required is that
he is willing to admit the compatibility of human freedom with
determinism, in this case the physical determinism that results
from the mixture of elements and contraries in our bodies. Given
that al-Kind¬ never makes any attempt to define ir®da or ikhtiy®r
in a way that requires the absence of an external cause, it seems
justified to say that he consistently takes a compatibilist line.
In this al-Kind¬ is definitely at odds with the Mu‘tazila, who
were equally consistent in defending an incompatibilist position.
This has been shown quite well in the case of the later Mu‘tazilite
‘Abd al-Jabb®r, whose discussion of the psychology of human
action has been expertly analyzed by Richard Frank.81 ‘Abd al-
Jabb®r considers the possibility of a position like the one taken
81 R.M. Frank, “The autonomy of the human agent in ‘Abd al-Jabb®r,” Le Muséon,
95 (1982): 323-55.
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by al-Kind¬ in the case of the stars’ obedience: that an agent’s
action flows from a rational belief or motivation. He emphatically
rejects this account, insisting that a free action can never be
predetermined, even by the agent’s own belief set and motiva-
tions. Of course ‘Abd al-Jabb®r is later than al-Kind¬, but I believe
that he is simply making more explicit the incompatibilism that
was always assumed in the Mu‘tazilite tradition. For example,
Bishr ibn al-Mu‘tamir distinguishes explicitly between acts that
are necessitated and acts that are the result of free choice.82 Al-
Khayy®fl gives a particularly clear expression of the Mu‘tazilite
position in expounding the view of Ab‚ al-Hudhayl: “an agent
does not perform an act without a similar act being possible for
him.”83 And the Mu‘tazilite al-J®Ωi˙, a contemporary of al-Kind¬’s,
distinguishes between the freedom of ‘aql (intellect) and the
necessitation of flab¬‘a (nature) in human action.84
Thus al-Kind¬ disagrees with the Mu‘tazila: they believe that
a plurality of acts must be available to an agent in order for the
agent to be free with regard to any of those acts, whereas al-Kind¬
thinks one can freely perform even an act that is necessitated.
But in the context of the larger debate, al-Kind¬ is of course on
the side of the Mu‘tazila, since he does affirm that humans are
free (albeit in a sense the Mu‘tazila would not recognize). A small
piece of evidence that al-Kind¬’s thinking about agency and
freedom is related to Mu‘tazilite discussions is that, in Proximate
Agent Cause, he seems to allude to mutawallid®t, “engendered
acts”:
The agent cause is either proximate or remote. The remote agent cause is like
one who shoots an arrow at an animal, and slays it. The shooter of the arrow
is the remote cause of the slaying, and the arrow is the proximate cause of the
82 Al-Ash‘ar¬, Maq®l®t al-isl®miyy¬n, 393.9 [VE XVII.22]; the view is ascribed to Bishr
at line 12.
83 Al-Khayy®fl, Kit®b al-Inti◊®r, 20.6-7. A useful contrast is provided by the thought
of Øir®r ibn ‘Amr, who is often said to have anticipated the Ash‘arite doctrine of
“acquisition (kasb),” holding that human acts are created directly by God, though they
are preceded temporally by “ability (istifl®‘a)” on the part of the human. See van Ess,
“Øir®r b. ‘Amr und die ‘Cahmiyya’,” pp. 270ff., and passages translated as VE XV.12-
15. The incompatibilism of the Mu‘tazila is displayed in their attacks on what they saw
as the determinism of Øir®r.
84 Like some present-day incompatibilists, J®Ωi˙ admits that free action is only
possible when all the motivations and inclinations due to nature are balanced in their
mutual opposition (see VE XXX.6, 13; note that he speaks of “inclinations (khaw®flir)”
as an impediment to free action, whereas al-Kind¬ makes inclination a precursor of
choice in On Definitions).
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slaying. For the shooter propels the arrow, with the intent of slaying, while
the arrow causes the slaying of the living thing. (219.2-5)
Al-Kind¬ does not enter here into the Mu‘tazilite debate about
engendered acts: if A causes B and B causes C, then is A or B the
cause of C?85 To take al-Kind¬’s example, is it the archer or the
arrow that is the “agent (f®‘il),” in other words the efficient cause,
of the mortal wound of the quarry?
Fortunately, al-Kind¬’s solution to the problem can be
reconstructed from another text. As we saw, his short treatise On
the True Agent asserts that only God is an agent in the proper
sense that He acts without His act being caused by a prior agent
(see section (I) above). We can understand this more fully by
returning to al-Kind¬’s claim that created things are agents in
only a metaphorical sense. What al-Kind¬ says about the created
thing is not that it is both acting and acted-upon, but that strictly
speaking it does not act at all: it is “purely an effect” (munfa‘il
maΩ¥).86 This is not to say, though, that the created thing cannot
cause something else: it can, and is indeed called “the proximate
cause” of its effects. Al-Kind¬ is not an occasionalist. What he
means by saying that the created “agent” does not truly act is
rather that it does not initiate an act that causes something else.
Rather, it gives rise to its effect only as a result of its being acted
upon (183.9-14 [RJ 169.14-171.4]). In this sense all acts in the
created world are “engendered,” that is, they proceed inevitably
from the originating first act of God, which is the act of creation,
the bestowal of being (183.1-2 [RJ169.7]).
However, taking into account al-Kind¬’s compatibilism, we can
see that this does not prevent created, “metaphorical” agents
from exercising freedom. Indeed for him the problem of
engendered acts is no longer pressing, and can be solved merely
by observing that an act may have many causes, some more
“proximate” to the act than others. These causes may “act”
because they are necessitated so to act, but only some of these so-
called “agents” (in this case, the archer, but not the arrow)
exercise a capacity of choice and are, presumably, morally
responsible for the result. What is it for such a cause to be free,
85 Particularly prominent is Mu‘ammar’s treatment of the problem. See the
discussion at Daiber, Das theologisch-philosophische System des Mu‘ammar, pp. 367
ff.
86 My thanks to an anonymous referee at this journal for bringing this point to my
attention.
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if it is not that the cause initiate its act without external
necessitation? To judge from On Definitions, we are free (in other
words, we have a power of volition and choice) because of the
structure of human psychology: we may be necessitated to choose,
but that choice proceeds through a process of rational deliber-
ation, just as in the case of the motion of the heavens, as we saw
above. It is this that guarantees human freedom, just as for many
modern-day compatibilists. By contrast, on the Mu‘tazilite,
incompatibilist theory, the only freedom (the only power to
choose) in any causal chain belongs to the cause that initiates the
chain, and whose action is thus uncaused. Al-Kind¬’s restriction
of the term “agent” in its proper sense to such an uncaused cause
may be borrowed from this Mu‘tazilite attitude, with the
significant difference that for al-Kind¬ only God is an agent in this
sense, whereas for the Mu‘tazila all free agents are capable of
uncaused action. If al-Kind¬ were an incompatibilist, he could
never speak of ir®da and ikhtiy®r in the case of created things
given the position he takes in On the True Agent. The inter-
pretation of al-Kind¬ as a compatibilist is the only one that allows
us to ascribe to him a consistent view.87
* * *
87 Here I should address two possible objections to my interpretation: (1) there is no
reason to think that al-Kind¬ is in fact consistent across his corpus, because he was
simply drawing on Greek sources and these may have been inconsistent with one
another; and (2) I have depended heavily on On Definitions, which may not be
authentic. In response to (1) I may refer the reader to my discussion of this problem
in The Arabic Plotinus, Appendix section 1. Briefly, I hold that al-Kind¬ was for the
most part trying to be consistent and was not slavishly dependent on his sources. All
else being equal, interpretations that show him to have achieved consistency are likely
to be historically correct as well as philosophically satisfactory. Regarding (2), the
authenticity of On Definitions, this has been thrown into doubt by D. Gimaret in his
introduction to the text and translation of the work in Al-Kind¬, Cinq Épîtres (Paris,
1976), pp. 8-13. After producing some indications of inauthenticity, such as the fact
that it is not mentioned in later lists of the Kindian corpus like the one in the Fihrist,
Gimaret concludes that its authenticity “n’est rien moins que certaine.” I believe on
the contrary that the work is almost certainly authentic, though we cannot rule out
that some definitions were inserted by later authors. This is suggested by numerous
parallels between On Definitions and the rest of the Kindian corpus. Some of these
parallels are mentioned by Gimaret. Here I would add only that the distinctive inclusion
of “nature” in the Plotinian hierarchy (to yield “First Cause, Intellect, Soul, Nature”)
represented in the first four definitions is paralleled not only in the Prologue to the
Theology of Aristotle, which I believe to have been written by al-Kind¬, but also in his
Sayings of Socrates (Alf®˙ Suqr®fl) edited by M. Fakhry, “Al-Kind¬ wa ’l-Suqr®fl,” al-
AbΩ®th, 16 (1936): 23-34, at p. 30.18-19. (On the Plotinian origin of this sequence in
On Definitions, see Klein-Franke, “Al-Kind¬’s ‘On Definitions and Descriptions of
Things’,” p. 199.) What are we to make of the unusual features of the transmission of
On Definitions, namely its absence from the Arabic bibliographies and its lack of an
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While one could extend this investigation to deal with other
issues, the foregoing makes possible some general conclusions.
The previous consensus, especially since Ivry’s discussion of the
problem, has been that al-Kind¬ agreed with the Mu‘tazila on
some points but saw them as intellectual rivals more than as
allies. Though this seems to me right, it is also worth emphasizing
that al-Kind¬ saw Mu‘tazilite discussions as an opportunity: by
drawing on the resources of the Greek philosophical tradition, he
hoped to solve some of the vexed theological controversies of his
time. He was not a mutakallim, but he wanted to respond to his
contemporaries and show the relevance of Greek thought to their
concerns. In terms of winning over the mutakallim‚n this project
was a failure, and it is easy to see why. Especially from the
standpoint of the later polemics of the kal®m tradition, al-Kind¬’s
positions on problems like divine attributes and human freedom
could easily seem to betray, rather than support, Mu‘tazilite
views. The ¯®hirite Ibn ºazm would later take al-Kind¬ to task
for falling into self-contradiction, by espousing negative theology
and yet describing God as a “cause (‘illa).”88 This accusation is
more intelligible in light of the positive theory of attributes we
uncovered in section (I). Similarly, al-Kind¬ is willing to speak of
ir®da and ikhtiy®r belonging to created things, but he denies that
humans can initiate (or, to use the terms of the later debate,
“create”) their acts. Here one should bear in mind that the later
controversy was not typically fought over the notion of “freedom,”
but over whether God or humans have the “power” to produce
an act. On this question, al-Kind¬ is not obviously on the side of
the Mu‘tazila. In fact, the Ash‘arites would later reproduce al-
Kind¬’s claim that only God is an “agent (f®‘il)”.89 This illustrates
introductory section addressed to al-Kind¬’s sponsor? (Both are mentioned by Gimaret,
though he is incorrect to say that all other epistles by al-Kind¬ have been transmitted
with these adulatory introductions: for example, neither On the True Agent nor the
aforementioned Sayings of Socrates have them). A possible explanation is that On
Definitions was not a formal epistle or treatise by al-Kind¬ but was intended as a tool
to be used in constructing those epistles, and also for consultation by his translators
or students. At any rate I think we may include On Definitions in the Kindian corpus:
it contains much that al-Kind¬ repeats elsewhere and nothing he could not have written.
It should certainly be used with caution if it is the sole evidence for al-Kind¬’s view on
a particular topic, but in this case my interpretation also draws on al-Kind¬’s
cosmological works.
88 See Daiber, “Die Kritik des Ibn ºazm an Kind¬s Metaphysik,” pp. 286-7.
89 See R.M. Frank, Creation and the Cosmic System: al-Ghaz®l¬ & Avicenna
(Heidelberg, 1992), p. 22.
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how un-Mu‘tazilite al-Kind¬ could be when defending a broadly
Mu‘tazilite doctrine. And that in turn helps to explain why,
whatever his intentions, al-Kind¬’s considerable historical
influence was almost wholly on the tradition of falsafa.90
90 I am grateful to Frank Griffel, and to two anonymous referees at this journal, for
helpful comments and suggestions. I also received helpful responses from participants
at an Arabic philosophy conference in June 2002, and a meeting of the School of
‘Abb®sid Studies in July 2002, both held at Cambridge University – especially I would
like to thank Ahmad Hasnawi, Wolfhart Heinrichs, James Montgomery, Marwan
Rashed, Tony Street, and Josef van Ess. Finally I am very grateful to Sophia Vasalou
for helping me revise the final version. Any remaining shortcomings are of course my
own.
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